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A significant fraction of the labor force consists of employed workers who are part-time 
unemployed (underemployed) in the sense that they are unable to work as much as they 
prefer. This paper develops a search and matching model to study the design of optimal 
unemployment insurance in an economy with unemployment as well as part-time 
unemployment. Part-time unemployment provides income insurance and serves as a stepping 
stone to full-time jobs. Unemployment benefits for part-timers increase the outflow from 
unemployment to part-time work but reduce the outflow from part-time work to fulltime 
employment. We examine the optimal structure of benefits for unemployed and 
underemployed workers. The results indicate non-negligible welfare gains associated with 
time limits for unemployment benefits as well as for part-time benefits. The welfare gains 
from optimal UI are larger when wages are fixed than when they are flexible. 
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 1 Introduction
Conventional measures of unemployment do not capture all dimensions of
joblessness. A case in point is underemployment among employed workers,
also frequently referred to as part-time unemployment. Workers in this cat-
egory are employed during a survey week but are unable to work as many
hours as they wish. An ILO-resolution from 1998 deﬁnes underemployment
as comprising persons in employment who (i) are willing to work additional
hours, (ii) are available to work additional hours, and (iii) worked less than
a threshold relating to working time. Underemployment accounts for a non-
negligible fraction of the labor force in most countries, although it is typically
somewhat lower in magnitude than the conventional measure of unemploy-
ment. By the end of 2009, it stood at almost 5 percent of the labor force in
the OECD area.1
Research on part-time unemployment has been meager compared to the
huge literature on “full-time” unemployment, perhaps reﬂecting the pre-
sumption that underemployment represents less of a social problem than
complete joblessness. It is clear, however, that part-time unemployment is of
a non-trivial magnitude and raises a number of important policy issues. One
issue, hotly debated in some countries, concerns labor market regulation and
the case for giving part-timers precedence to full-time jobs. Other issues deal
with unemployment insurance and concern the design of beneﬁtl e v e l sa n d
potential beneﬁt durations for the unemployed and the underemployed. Our
paper contributes to the literature on optimal unemployment insurance with
special focus on part-time unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the ﬁrst study that examines optimal unemployment insurance for
an economy with both unemployment and underemployment.
We study an economy with two sectors where full-time jobs are oﬀered
in one sector and part-time jobs in the other sector. One can think of these
sectors as representing two industries; indeed, the data show that the preva-
lence of part-time unemployment is heavily correlated with industry aﬃlia-
tion, being particularly common in service industries. Unemployed workers
1See OECD (2010), Figure 1.5 and the relevant source table.
2prefer full-time jobs but are willing to consider part-time jobs as a stepping
stone to full-time jobs. The unemployed worker thus searches for part-time
as well as full-time jobs and accepts the ﬁrst oﬀer that comes along. The
part-timer searches only for full-time jobs and quits her part-time job as soon
as a full-time oﬀer comes along.
Unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect search eﬀo r ta m o n gt h eu n e m p l o y e da sw e l l
as among the part-timers. More generous beneﬁts for part-timers reduce the
ﬂow from part-time work to employment as part-time status becomes more
attractive relative to employment. But beneﬁts for part-timers also make
part-time status more attractive relative to unemployment, thus increasing
the outﬂow from unemployment to part-time work. In that respect, oﬀering
beneﬁts to part-timers is akin to in-work beneﬁts, a policy which has received
considerable attention in both policy discussions and research.
We study the optimal structure of unemployment beneﬁts focusing on
beneﬁt levels (replacement rates) and the potential duration of beneﬁt receipt
for the unemployed as well as for part-timers. The model is of the search
and matching variety (Pissarides, 2000). We calibrate the model and ﬁnd
non-negligible welfare gains associated with time limits for unemployment
beneﬁts as well as for part-time beneﬁts. The welfare gains from optimal UI
are larger when wages are ﬁxed than when they are ﬂexible.
2 Related literature
Part-time work has attracted much attention in policy debates as well in labor
market research. One issue is whether part-time jobs serve as stepping stones
to full-time jobs or mainly constitute dead ends that trap some workers into
permanent low-income status; see e.g. Tam (1997) and papers in O’Reilly
and Fagan (1998). Another issue concerns how one should understand the
part-time pay penalty, i.e., the fact that hourly pay is typically found to be
lower for part-timers than for full-timers. The policy discussions have also
considered how transitions from part-time to full-time jobs can be aﬀected
by regulation and reforms of the unemployment insurance (UI) systems.
3Many countries have UI systems that extend UI eligibility to part-timers
who search for full-time jobs. There is a small empirical literature that
studies the eﬀects of such part-time beneﬁts on transitions to employment.
An early paper is Munts (1970), whoe x a m i n e sh o wp a r t - t i m eb e n e ﬁts aﬀect
search for regular work. He ﬁnds that workers adjust their part-time work
so as to gain from combined earnings and beneﬁts. The results in Holen
and Horowitz (1974) reinforce Munts’s hypothesis. A more recent paper by
McCall (1996) studies the eﬀe c to nj o bs e a r c hb e h a v i o ro fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
“disregard”, i.e. the highest allowed amount of earnings to still be eligible
for unemployment beneﬁts. He ﬁnds that an increase in the disregard lowers
expected unemployment duration and increases the conditional probability
of part-time reemployment. However, his analysis sheds no light on how
part-time beneﬁts aﬀect the transitions to full-time work.
Some recent Nordic studies examine how part-time beneﬁts inﬂuence
transitions from unemployment to full-time employment. Using data from
Finland, Kyyrä (2010) ﬁnds that part-time beneﬁts increase the probability
of ﬁnding regular jobs. Using data from Denmark, Kyyrä et al. (2010) ﬁnd
evidence of a signiﬁcant lock-in eﬀect: being on part-time beneﬁts lowers
the transition rate out of part-time employment, although there are positive
eﬀects for some subgroups. Månsson et al. (2008) ﬁnd that part-time un-
employed Swedish beneﬁt recipients have around 20 percent lower chance of
landing a full time job within two years compared to part-time unemployed
persons without beneﬁts.2
The paper also relates to the literature on optimal unemployment insur-
ance design. This literature has focused on issues such as the case for beneﬁt
variation over the spell of unemployment and the interaction between UI
and active labor market policy.3 Most papers have considered economies
with only unemployment and employment, ignoring involuntary part-time
work. New issues arise when there is part-time unemployment in the econ-
omy. Part-time beneﬁts subsidize part-time work and thus increase the ﬂow
2The problem of separating causal eﬀects from selection eﬀects is addressed (“timing
of events approach”) in Kyrrä (2010) and Kyrrä et al (2010) but not in the Swedish study.
3See Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) for a survey.
4out of unemployment. However, such beneﬁts are also bound to reduce the
outﬂow from part-time status to full-time employment.
3T h e M o d e l
3.1 The Labor Market
We consider an economy where part-time status is “involuntary” in the sense
that part-time workers prefer to work longer hours at the prevailing hourly
wage rate. Unemployed individuals are willing to accept part-time work as a
stepping stone to full-time work.4 Voluntary part-time work, reﬂecting pref-
erences for leisure or home production, is ignored. A satisfactory treatment
of both voluntary and involuntary part-time work would require a model
where workers have heterogeneous preferences; our model features workers
with identical preferences.
The economy is populated by inﬁnitely lived individuals who are all mem-
bers of the labor force. Workers can be in one of three mutually exclusive
states, i.e., they can be fully employed, fully unemployed (referred to as un-
employed), or part-time (un)employed; the third category is interchangeably
referred to as part-timers or underemployed. The size of the labor force is
normalized to unity and the labor force identity is written as
 +  +  =1 (1)
where   and  stands for employment, underemployment and unemploy-
ment, respectively. We let index ,  = , represent labor force states.
Employed workers can work as much as they prefer whereas part-timers
are unable to do so and they can therefore be viewed as involuntary part-
time unemployed. Part-timers search for full-time jobs in order to realize
their preferred working time. The unemployed search for part-time as well
as full-time jobs, recognizing that part-time jobs can provide partial income
4Panel data from the Swedish labor force statistics reveal substantial mobility out of
part-time unemployment. Over the period 2005—2009, some 20—25 percent of the part-
timers searching for full-time jobs have entered full-time work after one quarter.
5insurance as well as oﬀering stepping stones to full-time jobs. Search among
t h eu n e m p l o y e dt a k e sp l a c ei na nu n d i r e c t e df a s h i o n :t h e ys e a r c hf o rw o r k
and whether they become full-time or part-time employed is determined by
a random matching process. The probability that an individual unemployed
person ends up as employed depends on the number of vacant full-time jobs
relative to the competition she faces from other unemployed persons as well as
part-timers (since both groups compete for full-time jobs). Analogously, the
probability that she ends up as part-time employed depends on the number
of vacant part-time jobs relative to the number of unemployed (as only the
unemployed compete for part-time jobs).
There are two types of ﬁrms (two sectors) that oﬀer either full-time or
p a r t - t i m ej o b s . L e ti n d e x,  = , represent the type of job where 
and  stand for full-time and part-time jobs, respectively. The job ﬁnd-
ing rates are determined via sector-speciﬁc and constant returns matching
functions,  = ( ),w h e r e is the number of vacancies in sector
 and  is the eﬀective number of workers competing for jobs in sector
. Labor market tightness in each sector is given by  ≡ .T h er a t e
at which an unemployed worker with search eﬀort  ﬁnds a full-time job
is given by ( ) = (),w h e r e ≡  +  is the ef-
fective number searchers competing for full-time jobs. The rate at which
she ﬁn d sap a r t - t i m ej o bi sg i v e nb y( ) = (),w h e r e
 = . Analogously, a part-timer with search eﬀort  ﬁnds a full-time
job at the rate ( ) = (). Firms encounter searchers at the
rate  = ( ) = () and thus we have ()=().F o re a s e
of notation we will, when convenient to do so, use shorthand notations of the
form  = () and  = ().
Full-time as well as part-time jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate
. Job destructions always involve job losses for the workers, i.e., entry into
unemployment. The steady state ﬂow equilibrium conditions for  and  are
given as
6 [()+()] = (1 − ) (2)
[()+] = () (3)
where the left-hand sides capture the outﬂows from  and  and the right-
hand sides the inﬂows. Employment is obtained residually from the labor
force identity as  =1−  − .
3.2 Workers
The individual’s instantaneous utility is increasing in consumption and leisure.
Workers are risk averse and have identical preferences represented by a log-
arithmic utility function of the form:
 =l n + ln (4)
where  denotes consumption and  stands for leisure. We ignore borrowing
and savings so consumption equals income in each state.
Let  denote unemployment beneﬁts for the unemployed worker and 
beneﬁts for the part-timer. Let  d e n o t et h ew a g er a t ep e ru n i to fl a b o r
input and let  be working time. All incomes, including beneﬁts, are taxed at
the rate . The employed worker thus consumes  = (1 − ) ≡ (1 −
), whereas the part-timer consumes (1 − ) ≡ (1 − ). The part-
timer’s total consumption is thus given by  =(  + )(1−),w h e r e a st h e
unemployed worker’s consumption is  = (1 − ).
The individual’s time endowment is denoted . The time budget restric-
tion for the employed worker is given by  =  +; the relevant restriction
for the part-timer is  =  +  + ; and the unemployed worker faces the
restriction  =  + . For log utility we thus have
 =l n ( )+ ln( − ) (5)
 =l n (  + )+ln( −  − ) (6)
 =l n  + ln( − ) (7)
7We assume that full-timers are free to choose their desired working time.
With log utility, this implies  = (1+). Part-timers are unable to realize
their desired working time so   . Working time for part-timers is taken
as exogenous.
Consider the intertemporal objective functions associated with the three
states. Let  denote the expected discounted present value of utility for an
unemployed worker, let  be the corresponding value if the person is a part-
timer, and let  be the value if the person is employed. The value functions
are written as
 =  + ( − ) (8)
 =  + ( − )+()( − ) (9)
 =  +  [()( − )+()( − )] (10)
where  i st h es u b j e c t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e .A su s u a l ,t h eﬂow value of
employment, as given by (8), involves the instantaneous utility  as well as
a risk of job loss with an associated present value utility loss as the worker
switches from employment to unemployment. The ﬂow value of underem-
ployment, as given by (9), involves the instantaneous utility ,t h er i s k
of job destruction (the second term on the right-hand side), and also the
prospect of making a utility increasing transition to employment (the third
term). Finally, the ﬂow value of unemployment, as given by (10), entails
the instantaneous utility, , as well as the possibility of moving to either
employment or part-time status.5 It is assumed that the parameters of the
model are such that the inequalities  , and hold.
The value functions can be solved for present value diﬀerences. When
evaluated at  → 0, these expressions take the form:
5The value functions above imply that a job loss for a part-timer results in the same
income as is available for a full-time employed worker if laid oﬀ.T h i si sr e a l i s t i cf o rs o m e
countries to the extent that the part-timer has a history of full-time work.
8 −  =
1

[( + )( − )+( − )] (11)
 −  =
1

[( + ) − ( + ) − ( − )] (12)




where  ≡ ( +  + )( + ). It is clear that a proportional tax
on all labor income, including beneﬁts, will have no eﬀect on the present
value diﬀerences given by (11), (12) and (13).
The part-timer chooses search eﬀort, , in order to maximize ; like-
wise, the unemployed person chooses her search eﬀort, ,i no r d e rt om a x i -
mize .T h eﬁrst-order conditions are then given as:
 :

 −  − 




= ()( − )+()( − ) (15)
These conditions state that the marginal cost of increasing search eﬀort
should be equated to the expected marginal gain of doing so. It is clear
from the expressions that the marginal gain of increasing search eﬀort is
higher for an unemployed worker than for a part-timer. The unemployed
worker’s returns from additional search involve a chance of ﬁnding a part-
time job as well as a full-time job whereas the part-timer’s search is conﬁned
to full-time jobs. It follows immediately that an unemployed person allocates
more eﬀort to job search than a part-timer, i.e.,   . Indeed, it follows
that   +,i m p l y i n g  :a nu n e m p l o y e dp e r s o ne n j o y sl e s sl e i s u r e
than a part-timer.
3.3 Firms
Firms operate under constant returns to labor, an assumption that allow us
t ot r e a taj o ba sas t a n di nf o rt h eﬁrm (Pissarides, 2000). As already noted,
9we consider an economy with two sectors (industries), where one consists of
full-time jobs and the other includes part-time jobs. There is free entry of
ﬁrms in either sector and the number of jobs in each sector is endogenously
determined. Jobs of either type are destroyed at the rate . A full-time job
is never transformed into a part-time job so a worker who loses a full-time
job becomes unemployed.
Workers and jobs are randomly matched: a ﬁrm with a vacant full-time
job hires a job searcher at the rate () whereas a ﬁrm with a vacant part-
time job ﬁnds a worker at the rate ().L e t denote the present value of
opening a vacancy and  the ﬂow cost of a vacancy. The value functions for
vacancies then take the form:
 = − + ()( − ) (16)
 = − + ()( − ) (17)
Labor productivity, denoted , is exogenous and uniform across workers
and ﬁrms. The ﬂow values of occupied full-time and part-time jobs are then
written as:
 =(  − ) + ( − ) (18)
 =(  − ) + ( − )+()( − ) (19)
The second value function is slightly non-standard since it incorporates
on-the-job search, (): part-timers search for full-time jobs which they
land at the rate (). When the part-time worker quits, the part-time
job becomes vacant. Free entry implies  =0and the resulting two key job















where  → 0 is assumed. Free entry and zero discounting imply that the
steady-state ﬂows of proﬁts are equal to zero for both types of ﬁrms, i.e.,
 = ( − ) −  = ( − ) −  =0 .
103.4 Wage Determination
In search and matching models, wages are typically determined by decen-
tralized worker-ﬁrm Nash bargaining. This appr o a c hl e a d st oah i g hd e g r e e
of real wage ﬂexibility in response to shocks, a feature that has generated
some controversy in the recent literature; see for example Shimer (2005), Hall
(2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), and Pissarides (2009). Some authors have
argued that the baseline model generates too much wage ﬂexibility and have
considered models where the relevant threat points in the wage bargain are
the payoﬀs during delays rather than payoﬀs available if the parties sepa-
rate from each other. These models generate more wage rigidity than the
standard formulation.
We proceed under two polar assumptions regarding wage determination.
In the ﬁxed-wage regime, we simply impose completely rigid real wages. In
the ﬂex-wage case, we adopt the standard approach where wages are deter-
mined by decentralized worker-ﬁrm Nash bargaining with the outside options
taken as threat points. By considering both ﬁxed-wages and ﬂex-wages, we
can also shed light on how optimal UI policies are aﬀected by allowing for in-
centives in wage setting. The standard model implies that higher UI beneﬁts
lead to an increase in wage pressure, a mechanism that represents a source
of moral hazard in addition to the impact on search eﬀort. This mechanism
may suggest that optimal UI with ﬂexible wages would be less generous than
optimal UI with ﬁxed wages. This logic may not necessarily carry over to
our model, however; as we shall see, generous beneﬁts for part-timers may
actually provide incentives for wage moderation.
Consider, then, Nash bargaining with both full-time and part-time work-
ers. The relevant threat point for both categories is taken to be unemploy-
ment, . The Nash product for full-time ﬁr m si st h e n
Ω() ≡ ( − )
 ( − )
1−
where  ∈ (01) denotes the worker’s bargaining power. The ﬁrst-order
condition evaluated at  =0is




11where  = (). W en o t et h a tt h eﬁrst-order condition (22) is inde-
pendent of the tax rate when the utility function is logarithmic; we have
() =1 .
The relevant Nash product for part-time bargaining is
Ω() ≡ ( − )
 ( − )
1−
and the ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at  =0is




where  =  (). Again we note that the ﬁrst-order condition is in-
dependent of the tax rate. The marginal utility of a wage increase to the
part-time worker is () = ( + ).
3.5 Equilibrium
All ingredients of the model are now in place. The key relationships are
t h et w oj o bc r e a t i o ne q u a t i o n s ,t w oﬁrst-order conditions for optimal search,
and three equations for present value diﬀerences, i.e., (11), (12) and (13).
When wages are endogenous, we add the two ﬁrst-order conditions for wage















 −  − 
= ()( − ) (26)

 − 
= ()( − )+()( − ) (27)












12Equations (24) — (29) determine , , , ,  and , using also (11),
(12) and (13). The unemployment and underemployment rates,  and ,a r e
obtained from (2) and (3), noting that employment follows from  =1 −−.
One can use  ≡ + and  =  to determine  and .F i n a l l y ,
by invoking  =  we obtain the number of vacancies of either type,
 = .
As we have noted, the bargained (gross) wages are independent of the
tax rate; the tax is thus completely borne by the workers and the tax can be
determined residually from the government’s budget restriction. Government
revenues are given by
 ≡ [(1 −  − ) +  + ( + )]
and total beneﬁt expenditures are given by ≡ +. The tax rate can
then be obtained from the budget restriction  ()=. A proportional
tax on income including beneﬁts at the rate  is equivalent to a proportional










We are mainly interested in the impact of beneﬁts,  and .I ti su s e f u lt o
start the analysis with exogenous wages, in which case the model has a simple
recursive structure.  is determined from (24). Hence  is obtained from
(26) using (13). Using these results,  is obtained from (25) and ﬁnally 
from (27) using (11) and (12). It is helpful to make use of envelope properties
that follow from the fact that workers optimally choose search eﬀorts. Hence
 =  =0 . From (8) follows that  =0when evaluated at
the optimal .M o r e o v e r , =0follows from (9). When examining the
impacts of  and ,i ti st h u ss u ﬃcient to look at the impacts via () and
(). Table 1 summarizes some comparative statics results where starred
13signs are numerical results based on a calibrated version of the model; see
Appendix for details about the calibration.
Table 1. Comparative statics, exogenous wages.
      
 0 0 − 0 − − +
 0 + +∗ − −∗ +∗ −∗
When wages are ﬁxed, an increase in  has no impact on  and hence no
impact on  and therefore, via (25), no impact on  From (24) also follows
that  =0 .A n i n c r e a s e i n  reduces the utility diﬀerence ( − )
and thus the returns to search while part-time unemployed; thus   0.
Using also (25) we get   0. To understand this result, note that a
decline in  increases the value to ﬁr m so fp a r t - t i m ej o b ss i n c ew o r k e r ss t a y
longer as part-timers; hence the incentive to open more part-time vacancies
increases.
T h ei m p a c to n is slightly more involved. Consider the ﬁrst-order
condition for  as given by (27) and note that  enters via ( − ) and (−
).C l e a r l y ,ah i g h e r reduces both utility diﬀerences and thus   0.
T h ei m p a c to f works via (), ( −) and ( − ),w h e r e increases
and  − decreases with a rise in .N o t et h a t( −) increases with a rise
in ,af a c tt h a tr e ﬂects that part-time beneﬁt is akin to an in-work subsidy.
It is diﬃcult to sign  but the ambiguity is of some interest since it
suggests that high beneﬁts for part-timers may have negligible consequences
for unemployment. Indeed, for all calibrations of the model we ﬁnd that
  0, i.e., higher part-time beneﬁts increase search eﬀorts among the
unemployed.
The ambiguity of  makes it impossible to determine how an in-
crease in  aﬀect  and .H o w e v e r ,i f  0, it follows that   0.
Indeed, this is what the calibrated model implies. A rise in part-time beneﬁts
reduces unemployment as it encourages search eﬀorts among the unemployed.
However, there is also a concomitant decline in search eﬀorts among part-
timers that will reduce the pace at which they locate full-time jobs. Higher
part-time beneﬁts therefore tend to increase part-time unemployment.
14An increase in  increases  via reduced search eﬀorts among the unem-
ployed. This decline in  implies a concomitant fall in  via lower inﬂow
into part-time work. The net eﬀect on employment is negative: the rise in 
is bigger than the decline in .
3.6.2 Flexible Wages
To see how beneﬁts aﬀect wage bargaining, it is useful to examine the partial
equilibrium eﬀects by inspecting the ﬁrst-order conditions. We take labor
market tightness as given and use the envelope property that  −  and
 −  are invariant to derivative changes of search eﬀort when search is
optimally determined. From (11) and (22), it is clear that a rise in  as
well as a rise in  leads to higher wages for full-timers. The reason is that
either type of beneﬁt hike reduces the value of employment relative to the
value of unemployment. From (12) and (23) follow that a rise in  leads
to higher wages for part-timers, an implication of the fact that the utility
diﬀerence between part-time work and unemployment is reduced. From (12)
and (23) follow also that a rise in  leads to lower wages for part-timers.
This result ﬂo w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tar i s ei n increases the utility diﬀerence
between part-time work and unemployment while at the same time reducing
the marginal utility to the worker of a wage hike. Higher part-time beneﬁts
thus encourage wage moderation among part-timers.
The comparative statics for the general equilibrium with endogenous
wages are more involved. The system has no longer a simple recursive struc-
ture and analytical results are hard to come by. We have therefore resorted
to a computational model; see Appendix for details. Table 2 shows numerical
comparative statics results for the model with endogenous wages.
Table 2. Comparative statics, endogenous wages.
      ln()   
 − − − − + + + − + +
 − + + − + ± ± − + −
We note that higher part-time beneﬁts increase search eﬀort among the
15unemployed, as in the ﬁxed-wage case. Unemployment as well as employ-
ment is reduced whereas part-time unemployment increases. The partial
equilibrium wage moderation result of a rise in ,i . e . ,  0,d o e sn o t
generally carry over to the general equilibrium with endogenous labor market
tightness. Note that a rise in  reduces  and increases ,t h u si n c r e a s i n g
() and reducing ().B y i n v o k i n g t h e ﬁrst-order conditions (28) and
(29), it follows that  −  must decline relative to  −  which would sug-
gest an increase in  relative to . The negative partial equilibrium wage
response may therefore be oﬀset by wage responses to induced changes in
tightness.
This completes the positive analysis and we turn to normative issues.
4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
4.1 Optimal Policy with Indeﬁnite BeneﬁtP a y m e n t s
We ﬁrst consider a UI system with indeﬁnite beneﬁtp a y m e n t s . B e n e ﬁts
are ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on wage income and beneﬁts. We focus
on steady states and ignore discounting, i.e., we let  → 0.T h e r e l e v a n t
utilitarian welfare objective will then be the worker’s expected utility which
is a function of net income (consumption) in the three states:
Λ =l n ( 1− )+()+( + )+( 1−  − )() (31)
where wage incomes are given as  =  for full-timers and  = 
for part-timers. Beneﬁts can also be expressed in terms of replacement rates,
, i.e.,  =  and  = ( − ). The replacement rates capture
the fraction of income losses covered.6 Substitute the government budget
restriction into the welfare objective and obtain:
Λ = −ln[1 + ()] + ()+( + )+( 1−  − )() (32)
6Wages generally diﬀer between full-timers and part-timers. Our results are virtually
independent of the choice of wage concept in the deﬁnition of replacement rate.
16w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d ≡ (1 − ) and () is given by (30). Absent moral
hazard, i.e., with exogenous search eﬀort and exogenous wages, it is straight-
forward to conﬁrm that optimal insurance is full insurance, i.e., equal incomes
in the three states:  =  =  + . However, search eﬀort and wages
respond to beneﬁts and full insurance will not be optimal.
The welfare eﬀect of a policy is measured relative to a baseline. It is
expressed as the equivalent of a consumption tax that equalizes welfare across
policy regimes. Let Λ represent welfare associated with the benchmark and
Λ welfare associated with an alternative policy. The measure of the welfare
gain of policy  relative to policy  is given by the value of the tax rate 
that solves Λ [(1 − );·]=Λ. With logarithmic utility functions we have
∆Λ ≡ Λ − Λ = −ln(1 − ) ≈ .
Our calibrated model replicates some key features of the Swedish labor
market. We consider a baseline case with unemployment at 6 percent, part-
time unemployment at 25 percent and a full-time wage premium of 5 percent.
The statutory replacement ratio can be as high as 80 p e r c e n ti nS w e d e nb u t
coverage of UI is relatively low: only around a third of the unemployed in
2009 are covered by UI according to the labor force surveys. We set the
replacement rate to 03 for the unemployed as well as for part-timers to cap-
ture incomplete coverage as well as ﬁnite beneﬁt duration. Table 3 shows
the baseline outcome along with the outcomes associated with optimal uni-
form replacement rates,  = , as well as optimally diﬀerentiated beneﬁts.
When wages are treated as ﬁxed, they are frozen at the baseline levels.
The optimal uniform system involves a replacement rate slightly higher
than the benchmark 30 percent for both wage regimes. The rise in the
replacement rate leads to a decline in unemployed search as well as in part-
time search. Unemployment as well as part-time unemployment increases as
the outﬂow rates decline. The welfare gain relative to the baseline is trivial
when wages are negotiated but amounts to 024 percent of consumption in
the ﬁxed-wage case. The optimally diﬀerentiated system, displayed in the
last two columns, yields further welfare gains. The replacement rate for the
unemployed increases whereas it declines for part-timers compared to the
optimal uniform system.
17Table 3. Optimal UI, indeﬁnite beneﬁtp a y m e n t s .
Baseline Optimal Optimally
case uniform diﬀerentiated
 030 034 031 040 037
 030 034 031 029 022
 0198 0198 0191 0198 0168
 0005 0009 0006 0004 0001
 0994 0927 0977 0798 0862
 0299 0199 0242 0318 0270
 0922 0922 0923 0922 0928
 0876 0876 0887 0876 0945
ln() 0050 0050 0040 0050 −0018
 0060 0061 0061 0074 0078
 0025 0044 0033 0022 0017
 0915 0895 0906 0904 0905
 0023 0030 0025 0035 0033
Wages Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible
Welfare
∆Λ (%) 024 005 065 038
We also note that overall UI is less generous with ﬂexible wages than with
ﬁxed wages. This is as expected given a presumption that wage responses
reinforce moral hazard. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the optimally diﬀerentiated
system with ﬂexible wages involves wage increases relative to the baseline.
Moreover, the welfare gains from optimal UI are smaller with ﬂexible wages;
generous UI is more costly when the forces of moral hazard carry more weight.
4.2 Optimal Policy with Time Limits
So far we have assumed that beneﬁts last forever. Now let us consider time
limits for  and . This is modeled along the lines of Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2001). Beneﬁts expire randomly at the rate  for full-time unemployed
and the rate  for part-timers. When UI beneﬁts expire, workers have ac-
18cess to unemployment assistance and are referred to as non-insured. The
value function for  is modiﬁed so as to distinguish between those insured
() and those non-insured (). Insured full-timers get  = 
 whereas
those not insured get  = 
 . Wages for part-timers are taken to be
“quasi-ﬁxed” in the sense that they remain constant for the duration of the
job, an assumption that rules out wage diﬀerences between insured and non-
insured part-timers. Part-timers receive  = 
 ( − ) if insured and
 = 
  ( − ) if not insured.
We need to distinguish between search eﬀo r ta m o n gt h o s ei n s u r e da n d
those not insured. Moreover, we have to recognize that there are two groups








The tightness concepts are deﬁned as before, i.e.,  ≡ ,  = .






















The modiﬁed value functions are obtained as:
 =  + (








































































Employed workers as well as part-timers are immediately eligible for
UI when laid oﬀ.T h e ﬂow value of being insured unemployed, ,i n -
cludes a term that captures the risk of beneﬁt expiration and the associated
19change in the value of unemployment, 
¡
 − ¢
. When the non-insured
unemployed worker ﬁnds a part-time job, she becomes immediately eligi-
ble for part-time beneﬁts; the change in the state values is thus given by
 − .T h eﬂow value of being an insured part-timer, ,i n v o l v e st h e
term (−) that captures the risk of beneﬁtt e r m i n a t i o na n dt h er e l a t e d
change in the value of being part-time unemployed.
The relevant utility functions are:
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The usual optimality conditions apply: the marginal cost of increasing
search eﬀort should be equated to the expected marginal gain of doing so.
A comparison of (42) and (44) reveals that the marginal gain of increasing
search eﬀort is higher for an unemployed insured worker than for an insured
part-timer as long as   ; indeed,    must hold in order to induce
the unemployed worker to accept part-time jobs. It follows that the insured
unemployed worker allocates more eﬀort to job search than the insured part-
timer, i.e., 
  
. An analogous argument implies that the non-insured
unemployed worker allocates more eﬀort to job search than the non-insured
part-timer, i.e., 
  
 .W e a l s o n o t e t h a t 
  
 as well as 
  

20holds under the assumptions that the optimal policy implies    and
  :b e n e ﬁt cuts boost search eﬀort by increasing the marginal gain
from additional search.





 , as well as two parameters determining
the potential duration of beneﬁt receipt,  and . We proceed by focusing on
two special cases. The ﬁrst case involves indeﬁnite unemployment beneﬁts
whereas part-time beneﬁts are subject to time limits. In this case, there are
four policy parameters of interest, viz. , 
, 
 and . The second case
we consider entails indeﬁnite part-time beneﬁts but unemployment beneﬁts




4.2.1 Time Limits for Part-time Beneﬁts
The ﬂow equilibrium condition for unemployment remains intact for the ﬁrst













Time limits pertaining to part-time beneﬁts aﬀect the value to ﬁrms of
having part-timers employed. When an insured part-timer loses beneﬁts, her
search eﬀort is aﬀected and thereby the probability of landing a full-time job
and thus leaving the ﬁrm. The value functions take the form:























































in (48) captures the fact that the insured part-
timer loses beneﬁts at the rate  which brings about a change in the value
21to the ﬁrm of having a part-timer employed. The values of ﬁlled part-time








 +  + ()
















 holds when the optimal policy implies  
. An insured part-timer is more valuable to the ﬁrm than a non-insured
one since she is likely to stay longer in the ﬁrm.
The value functions imply that the job creation condition for part-time





 +  + ()
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There are two groups of workers who bargain over wages: full-time work-
ers and insured part-timers. The relevant threat point for all workers is
insured unemployment .T h eN a s hﬁrst-order condition for a full-timer is
similar to (22):





where  = (). When an unemployed worker lands a part-time job she
is immediately eligible for part-time beneﬁts. The part-time wage is taken as
constant for the duration of the job and is obtained from a Nash ﬁrst-order










 is given by (51).7
The equilibrium of this economy is obtained from three ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for optimal search (, 
 and 
 ) along with the free entry conditions
7We have also considered the case where part-time wages are renegotiated once a part-
timer switches from the insured to the non-insured state. The welfare results are very
similar.
22for ﬁrms, the Nash bargaining equations, and the ﬂow equilibrium conditions.
To determine optimal search, we also need to make use of the present value
diﬀerences  − ,  − ,  −  and  −  which are obtained from
the value functions given by (37)—(41). (Recall that  =0in this analysis.)
The welfare function is slightly modiﬁed and takes the form:























Beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on all income, including beneﬁts.




 +  + 
(1 −  − ) + 
(57)
4.2.2 Time Limits for Unemployment Beneﬁts
We now consider a policy where unemployment beneﬁts are subject to time
limits whereas part-time beneﬁts are paid indeﬁnitely. The relevant policy
parameters are thus , 
, 
 and .T h eﬂow equilibrium equations for the
two unemployment states and part-time unemployment are as follows:























 =[  + ()] (60)
The job creation conditions are given by (24) and (25), exactly as in a
regime without any time limits. Wages are obtained from Nash ﬁrst-order
conditions of the form given by (54). The welfare function is:


















+[ln( + )+ln( −  − )]
+(1−  − )[ln()+( − )] (61)




 +  + 
(1 −  − ) + 
(62)
234.2.3 Results
Table 4 presents numerical results for exogenous wages and Table 5 the results
for endogenous wages. The previous results for indeﬁnite and uniform beneﬁt
payments are reproduced in the ﬁr s tt w oc o l u m n s .T h et h i r dc o l u m n ss h o w
the eﬀects of introducing time limits pertaining to part-time beneﬁts while
maintaining indeﬁnite beneﬁts payments for the unemployed. The fourth
columns show the eﬀects of time limits for unemployment beneﬁts. Finally,
the ﬁfth columns allow for time limits for part-time beneﬁts as well as unem-
ployment beneﬁts. The time unit is a day so 1 gives the expected potential
duration of beneﬁtd a y sf o rp a r t - t i m e r sa n d1 the analogous measure for
unemployed persons. A number of observations can be made.
The optimal UI systems involve steeply declining replacement rates over
the spell of unemployment as well as over the spell of part-time work. The
replacement rates in the ﬁrst tiers are on average roughly twice as large as
the levels in the second tiers. It is noteworthy that the ﬁrst-tier replacement
rate for a part-timer is at least as high (or higher) as the corresponding
replacement rate for an unemployed person; the second-tier replacement rates
are somewhat lower for part-timers. The potential duration of beneﬁt receipt
is longer for the unemployed. The number of non-insured unemployed is
substantially higher than the number of insured ones. Moreover, the number
of non-insured part-timers exceeds the number of insured ones by a large
magnitude.
We also note that the overall welfare gain from beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation
is mainly driven by the gain associated with time limits for unemployment
beneﬁts, a result apparent from comparisons of the third and fourth columns
in the tables. Finally, the welfare gain from optimal UI is smaller when
wages are ﬂexible (062 percent of consumption relative to 092 percent in the
ﬁxed-wage case); this conﬁrms results from the analysis of indeﬁnite beneﬁt
payments. However, it is no longer obvious that the optimal UI system is
less generous with ﬂexible wages than with ﬁxed wages; we note that the
potential duration of beneﬁt receipt is longer in the ﬂex-wage regime.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal after-tax income proﬁles for part-timers
24and unemployed persons when wages are endogenously determined. The
incomes are measured relative to net incomes among full-time employees and
t h es p e l ld u r a t i o n sa r em e a s u r e di nd a y s .
Why do the optimal replacement (and income) proﬁles decline over spells
of job search? By introducing time-dependent beneﬁts, incentives for active
j o bs e a r c ha r es t r e n g t h e n e d . C o n s i d e ra nu n e m p l o y e dp e r s o nw h o s eb e n e -
ﬁts have expired. By ﬁnding a job, entitlement to future beneﬁt receipt in
case of unemployment is secured. The bigger the diﬀerence is between un-
employment beneﬁts and unemployment assistance, the stronger the search
incentives to requalify for UI beneﬁts via employment.
Unemployed persons receiving unemployment assistance can also qualify
for part-time beneﬁts by ﬁnding a part-time job. The higher the income
associated with part-time insured unemployment is relative to unemployment
assistance, the stronger the incentive to actively search for part-time work.
It is clear, however, that generous UI beneﬁts for part-timers reduce their
incentives to search for full-time jobs. This can be oﬀset by a threat of beneﬁt
expiration, i.e., a time limit for UI beneﬁt receipt also for part-timers.
25Table 4. Optimal UI with Time Limits (TL), exogenous wages.
Baseline Optimal TL for TL for TL for
case uniform part-timers unemployed both groups





 030 034 076 031 062

 029 031
1 0 0 67 0 40
1 0 0 0 91 91
 0198 0198 0198 0198 0198
 0005 0009 0005 0005 0006





 0299 0199 0211 0278 0231

 0318 0278
 0060 0061 0074 0024 0024
 0044 0044
 0025 0044 0003 0028 0002
 0021 0026
 0915 0895 0902 0904 0904
 0023 0030 0035 0036 0036
Welfare
∆Λ (%) 024 066 091 092
26Table 5. Optimal UI with time limits (TL), endogenous wages.
Baseline Optimal TL for TL for TL for
case uniform part-timers unemployed both groups





 030 031 074 020 084

 022 022
1 0 0 91 0 59
1 0 0 0 125 125
 0198 0191 0162 0155 0153
 0005 0006 0003 0001 0002





 0299 0242 0230 0247 0204

 0363 0317
 0922 0923 0929 0931 0931
 0876 0887 0907 0968 0928
ln() 0050 0040 0024 −0040 0003
 0060 0061 0079 0031 0031
 0050 0047
 0025 0033 0003 0013 0002
 0016 0018
 0915 0890 0902 0906 0902
 0023 0025 0035 0037 0037
Welfare
∆Λ (%) 005 043 057 062
5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed an equilibrium search and matching model where risk-
averse workers occupy one of three mutually exclusive states, namely (full-
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Figure 1: Net incomes by spell durations
Part-time unemployment is a stepping stone to full-time jobs. The model is
used to study the design of optimal unemployment insurance. We examine
optimal two-tier beneﬁt schemes for the unemployed as well as for the part-
time unemployed, noting that beneﬁts for part-timers may encourage job
search among the unemployed but at the same time discourage search for
full-time jobs among part-timers. Our results suggest that steeply declining
replacement rates over the search spells are optimal for unemployed persons
as well as for part-timers.
There are a number of conceivable extensions of the model. We have
treated preferences as uniform across individuals, a simpliﬁcation that is
bound to be patently unrealistic. Introducing heterogeneity in preferences,
such as heterogeneity in the preference for leisure, raises new issues. When
preferences are private information, it will be diﬃcult for the policy maker to
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary part-time work. In particular,
the policy must be structured so that those who prefer part-time work are
excluded from beneﬁts intended for workers who are involuntary unemployed.
28These and other issues are left for future work.8
APPENDIX
The Numerical Model
The calibration is done with an eye on the Swedish labor market. The
matching function is Cobb Douglas,  = 1−,w h e r e =0 5 is assumed;
this is broadly consistent with most empirical studies. Productivity is nor-
malized to unity for both part-time and full-time employees:  =1 .T h et i m e
period is taken to be a day. The rate of interest (equal to the rate of time
preference) is set to zero. The annual separation rate is set to 15 percent
corresponding to daily rate of 015365 = 0000411.
UI coverage is relatively low; according to the labor force surveys, around
o n et h i r do ft h eu n e m p l o y e dr e c e i v e du n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts over the period
2005—2009. We account for this by choosing a benchmark replacement rate
of 30 percent for both unemployed and part-timers, i.e.,  =  =0 3.
The choices of  and  are guided by empirical results regarding the partial-
equilibrium responsiveness of job ﬁn d i n gt oc h a n g e si nb e n e ﬁts. Estimates of
the job ﬁnding elasticity with respect to beneﬁts center around 05;t h i sw o u l d
imply lnln ≈− 05 since the job ﬁnding rate is given by  = ()
and tightness is taken as given in the partial equilibrium context. We end
up with  =1 5912 and  =0 72 using a conventional model with only two
states, i.e., employment and unemployment.
Regarding work hours we assume that the full-time employee works as




since this is the worker’s preferred working time given the preferences we have
assumed. Working time among part-timers is given by  =0 5,w h i c hi s
8Preliminary work on a model with worker heterogeneity and both voluntary and in-
voluntary part-time work suggest that positive part-time beneﬁts would be optimal even
if the policy maker is unable to observe worker types (see Ek and Holmlund, 2011).
29in line with Swedish data: involuntary part-timers in the labor force surveys
report that they wish to work twice as much as they actually do.
Regarding wages, empirical work has documented wage penalties for part-
timers. A recent Swedish study by Wahlberg (2008) suggests a wage penalty
of 20 percent, perhaps implausibly large. We aim for a full-time wage pre-
mium of less than 10 percent. When baseline wages are determined by Nash
bargaining we obtain  =0 922 and a wage premium for full-time workers
of 5 percent.
The matching parameter , and the vacancy cost  are chosen so as to
obtain 6 percent unemployment and a part-time rate at 25 percent. This
p a r t - t i m er a t ei sl o w e rt h a nt h em e a s u r eo fp a r t - t i m eu n e m p l o y m e n ti nt h e
labor force surveys (4 percent) but higher than a part-time measure that
includes only those who report active search for work (15 percent). We set
 =0 0126 and  =5and end up with  =0 025.
The parameterized model produces outcomes as given by the ﬁrst column
in Table 3 in the main text.
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